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Report to the House of Delegates*
Inter-American Convention Against Corruption**
RECOMMENDATIONS
Be It Resolved, that the American Bar Association supports the prompt ratifica-
tion and implementation of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption
(Inter-American Convention) by the United States, by other members of the
Organization of American States (OAS), and by other countries that are eligible
to accede to the Inter-American Convention.
Be It Further Resolved, that the American Bar Association urges
1. that such ratification be subject to minimal reservations and understandings;
and
2. that such implementation be full, effective and consistent.
*This Recommendation was approved by the Council of the Section at its Executive Meeting on
August 2, 1997, in Washington, D.C.
**The Task Force on International Standards for Corrupt Practices of the Section of International
Law and Practice took the lead in preparing the foregoing Recommendation and Report. This Task
Force was chaired by Stuart H. Deming and John A. Detzner.
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Be It Further Resolved, that, to assure consistency and effectiveness, the
American Bar Association supports the criminalization of the bribery of foreign
officials through the Inter-American Convention and through other instruments
and fora in a manner consistent with the agreed upon common elements set forth
in the Annex to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's
(OECD) Revised Recommendation of the Council on Combating Bribery in Inter-
national Business Transactions and with the basic principles of the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act of the United States.
Be It Further Resolved, that the American Bar Association supports efforts
by the OECD and its member countries to promptly carry out, fully implement,
and actively enforce the OECD's Revised Recommendation of the Council on
Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions in a manner that effec-
tively deters foreign corrupt practices in the conduct of international business.
REPORT
I. Introduction
The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (Inter-American Conven-
tion) was adopted and opened for signature on March 29, 1996 in Caracas, Venezu-
ela. ' It is the first multilateral legal framework established to combat public corrup-
tion in international business transactions. 2 It seeks to promote and strengthen
cooperation to "prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption in the perfor-
mance of public functions."3 The Inter-American Convention identifies acts ofcor-
ruption to which the Inter-American Convention applies and contains binding obli-
gations as well as hortatory principles.4 It also provides for institutional
development and mechanisms for the enforcement of anti-corruption measures.
To assure the effectiveness of the Inter-American Convention, the United States
must reaffirm its leadership by moving quickly and forcefully to ratify and imple-
ment the Inter-American Convention to the fullest extent possible. The American
Bar Association (ABA) is prepared to support such ratification and implementa-
tion in the United States and elsewhere. Given the position taken by the ABA
in 1995 to support efforts to deter corrupt practices in the conduct of international
business and given the history of the ABA in promoting democracy and the rule
1. Specialized Conference on the Draft Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, OEA/
Ser.K/XXXIV.I CICOR/doc. 16/96 rev. 2, 9 Sept. 1996 (hereinafter "Specialized Conference"),
at 6.
2. "Toward the Next American Century: A U.S. Strategic Response to Foreign Competitive
Practices," Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee, Fourth Annual Report to the U.S. Congress
("Fourth Annual Report of Trade Promotion Committee"), Oct. 1996, at 115.
3. "Summary of the Organization of American States Inter-American Convention Against Cor-
ruption," U.S. Department of Commerce, Chief Counsel for International Commerce, Apr. 30,
1996 (hereinafter "Summary"), at 3.
4. Id.
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of law,5 a unique opportunity is provided through the ABA to place the resources
and experiences of U.S. lawyers at the disposal of governments, international
organizations and non-governmental organizations to assist in the ratification and
implementation of the Inter-American Convention.
II. Background
The Inter-American Convention was negotiated under the auspices of the Orga-
nization of American States (OAS) following a mandate agreed to by the 34 heads
of state that participated in the Summit of the Americas in 1994.6 The OAS
General Assembly later instructed its Permanent Council to "convene a special-
ized conference to consider and, if appropriate, adopt a draft 'Inter-American
Convention Against Corruption.' '" As part of this process, one of the specialized
OAS entities, the Inter-American Juridical Committee (OAS Juridical Commit-
tee), was involved in the initial drafting and structuring of the Inter-American
Convention. 8 On October 4, 1995, the Permanent Council authorized a special
series of meetings and urged member states to designate experts and called upon
the OAS Juridical Committee to participate in the review of the draft Inter-
American Convention. 9
On February 22, 1996, the Permanent Council approved the convocation of the
Specialized Conference,'o which took place in Caracas, Venezuela from March 27
to 29, 1996. " The Inter-American Convention was approved at the fourth session
on March 29, 1996.12 Twenty-one countries signed it at the closing ceremony. 13
Two additional countries have since signed the Inter-American Convention,
including the United States on June 2, 1996.14 The Inter-American Convention
entered into force on March 6, 1997, after the second of the instruments of
ratification of Paraguay and Bolivia were deposited with the OAS General Secre-
tariat. Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, Costa Rica and Ecuador have since deposited
their instruments of ratification. '" The Inter-American Convention remains open
for signature, ratification and accession by any state.' 6
5. ABA Recommendation and Report, Report No. 117A, Feb. 1995.
6. Summary at 1.
7. Specialized Conference at 1.
8. Id. (referring to CP/GT/PEC-22/95-Intemational Cooperation against Corruption prepared
by the OAS Juridical Committee).
9. Id. (referring to CP/RES. 658 (1044/95)).
10. Id. at 3.
11. Id. at 3 and 6.
12. Id. at 6.
13. The signatories at the closing ceremonies included Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colom-
bia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela. Id. at 6.
14. Guatemala and the United States. Report of Official, U.S. Permanent Mission to the OAS,
June 25, 1997.
15. Id.
16. Inter-American Convention at Art. XXI-XXIII.
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III. Summary of Inter-American Convention
The Inter-American Convention applies to civil servants at all levels, high-level
political appointees and temporary government officials, and others carrying out
"public" functions.' 7 "[A]ny temporary or permanent, paid or honorary activity,
performed by a natural person in the name of the State or in the service of the
State or its institutions, at any level" is considered a "public function." 18 And
"public official," ".government official" and "public servant" are placed under
one broad definition covering "any official or employee of the State or its agen-
cies, including those who have been selected, appointed, or elected to perform
activities or functions in the name of the State or in the service of the State, at
any level of its hierarchy. '"' 9
A. ACTS OF CORRUPTION
The Inter-American Convention applies to the direct or indirect solicitation
or acceptance by a government official of any benefit: for himself or for another
person or entity in exchange for any act or omission in the performance of his
public functions; the offering or granting of such benefits; acts or omissions in
the course of public functions to obtain such benefits; and the fraudulent use or
concealment of property derived from, or any participation in, an act of corrup-
tion.2" All parties must establish these corrupt practices as a criminal offense
under their domestic law. 2' In addition, each party must establish its jurisdiction
over such offenses when committed in its territory. 22
B. TRANSNATIONAL BRIBERY
As only one OAS country, the United States, outlaws the bribery of foreign
officials, such bribery is not listed as an act of corruption in the Inter-American
Convention. Instead, it is treated in a separate article.23 In that article, the parties
to the Inter-American Convention, "subject to their Constitutions and the funda-
mental principles of their legal systems," agree to prohibit and punish transna-
tional bribery of foreign officials. 24 Once established as a criminal offense under
the domestic laws of a party, transnational bribery will be considered an act of
corruption under the Inter-American Convention. 25 For those countries that ratify
17. In certain circumstances, consultants may be considered "public officials" under the terms
of the Inter-American Convention. Summary at 4.
18. Inter-American Convention at Art. I.
19. Id.
20. Id. at Art. VI.
21. Id. at Art. VII.
22. Id. at Art. V, 1.
23. Id. at Art. VIII.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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and implement the Inter-American Convention, this "subject to" proviso may
provide a convenient excuse for parties to avoid the implementation of prohibitions
against transnational bribery. It is therefore essential that the use of the proviso
be extremely limited and not be used as an artificial justification for failing to carry
out both the spirit and the express language of the Inter-American Convention.
The Inter-American Convention's elements of the offense of foreign official
bribery are in general terms quite similar to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA).26 Both legal regimes are comparable in scope: both apply to payments
made in seeking to obtain or retain business; and both focus on the giving of
something of value for an act or omission by an official, or exercise of influence,
in violation of his or her duties. The differences between the two legal regimes
are matters of detail rather than fundamental concepts or principles.27
Perhaps the key apparent difference is that the Inter-American Convention
does not explicitly provide an exception for facilitating payments like the FCPA.2"
Payments to secure "routine governmental actions," as opposed to a discretionary
act or decision, do not violate the FCPA.2 9 Such facilitating payments could be
considered payments made to an official "in exchange for [an] act . . . in the
performance of his public functions," 30 and therefore may be considered acts of
corruption under the Inter-American Convention. However, the report of the OAS
Juridical Committee on model elements for inclusion in domestic implementing
legislation, at least implicitly, recognizes that countries may be able to exclude
facilitating payments from their legislation.31
There are other less apparent differences.32 Yet, notwithstanding these differ-
ences, the basic contours of the transnational bribery provisions of the Inter-
American Convention are consistent with the basic principles of the FCPA. Be-
cause of this, it may be possible for the United States to take the position that
the FCPA represents full implementation of Article VIII of the Inter-American
26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 et seq.
27. With respect to the key definition of public official, some commentators have, for example,
argued that the Inter-American Convention provides greater clarity. L. Low, K. Atkinson & A.
Bjorklund, "A Comparison of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption and U.S. Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act," Prepared for Inter-American Bar Association XXXIIIrd Conference, May
18-23, 1997, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, at 34.
28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b) and 78dd-2(b).
29. Id.
30. Inter-American Convention at Art. VI, 1, (a) and (b).
31. L. Low, K. Atkinson & A. Bjorklund, "A Comparison of the Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption and U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act," at 31.
32. Unlike the FCPA, promises are not expressly covered in Article VIII of the Inter-American
Convention, relating to transnational bribery. This may be insignificant since "offering something
of value to a foreign official in exchange for a benefit" is an act of corruption. L. Low, K. Atkinson
& A. Bjorklund, "A Comparison of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption and U.S.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act," at 27-28 (citing Art. VI, 1, (b)). The Inter-American Convention
may cover a broader scope of benefits to a public official than is traditionally viewed under the
FCPA. Id. at 29. Also, what constitutes a "public official" appears to be more limited under the
Inter-American Convention.
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Convention, and ratify it subject to that understanding. The United States may
also want to consider whether the FCPA could be improved by adopting certain
provisions of the Inter-American Convention, but that exercise should not detract
from the fundamental desirability of ratification of the Inter-American Convention
by the United States and other OAS member states.
C. ILLICIT ENRICHMENT
Illicit enrichment is also not listed as an act of corruption under the Inter-
American Convention. Like transnational bribery, it is treated as a separate arti-
cle. Illicit enrichment is defined as "a significant increase in the assets of a
government official that he cannot reasonably explain in relation to his lawful
earnings during the performance of his functions." 33 "Subject to their Constitu-
tions and the fundamental principles of their legal systems," ' parties to the
Inter-American Convention are required to make illicit enrichment an offense
under their laws.35
Some OAS countries had recognized illicit enrichment as an offense under
their domestic laws prior to the adoption of the Inter-American Convention. In
the United States, there are a variety of federal and state laws and regulations
which, in combination, effectively address the issue of illicit enrichment by gov-
ernment officials. For example, the net worth method of proof in prosecuting
tax evasion cases under 26 U.S.C. § 7201 has been used for years in the United
States as a recognized means of addressing a form of unjust enrichment. As a
result, from a constitutional standpoint, as long as the burden of proving illicit
enrichment remains with the government, there does not appear to be a conflict
with basic U.S. legal principles.
It is unlikely that the United States will seek to establish illicit enrichment as
a separate offense under U.S. law. As suggested, it may not be necessary. How-
ever, in considering the Inter-American Convention for ratification, every effort
should be made to achieve an effective balance between protecting fundamental
U.S. legal principles and encouraging full U.S. cooperation with other countries
in addressing public corruption. In order for the United States to be credible in
leading efforts to deter corruption in the conduct of international business, it is
critical that the United States be perceived as being receptive to and indeed
dedicated to implementing and carrying out the essential elements of the Inter-
American Convention.
33. Inter-American Convention at Art IX.
34. This is the same proviso found in Article VIII, pertaining to transnational bribery, of the
Inter-American Convention.
35. Inter-American Convention at Art. VIII and IX.
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D. COOPERATION
Parties to the Inter-American Convention that do not establish transnational
bribery or illicit enrichment as offenses under their domestic laws must, to the
extent permitted by their laws, provide the assistance and cooperation provided
for in the Inter-American Convention to other parties with regard to transnational
bribery and illicit enrichment.36 The Inter-American Convention seeks to max-
imize cooperation among the parties.37 Provision is also made to preclude the
use of bank secrecy laws or political grounds as bases for refusing to cooperate."
E. EXTRADITION
Despite the special provisions of the Inter-American Convention to assure
cooperation, unless a party makes such acts offenses under its domestic law, the
extradition provisions do not apply to illicit enrichment, transnational bribery,
or the acts described under its domestic law. In general, the Inter-American
Convention extends existing extradition treaties among parties to include the
offenses under the Inter-American Convention and provides that the Inter-
American Convention may serve as the legal basis for extradition among parties
that do not have extradition treaties among themselves or that do not require
39extradition treaties.
F. RATIFICATION
The Inter-American Convention thus represents a path-breaking step forward
in the efforts to combat public corruption. It is critical to the success of this effort
that the Inter-American Convention be ratified by most, if not all, of the OAS
member states. It is also important that such ratification not be accompanied by
reservations or understandings that would significantly dilute the extent of a
country's commitment. The Inter-American Convention permits reservations,
but only to specific articles.40
While the "escape clauses" provided in the transnational bribery and illicit
enrichment provisions of Articles VIII and IX, respectively, may allow ratification
without implementing these articles and without taking a reservation, it is im-
portant that these provisos be used sparingly and only in the case of clear conflict
with national constitutions or fundamental legal principles that cannot be resolved
through any lesser means. In a similar regard, for reasons discussed below in
Part V., it is also critical that national implementation possess a high degree of
36. Id.
37. E.g., Inter-American Convention at Art. XV.
38. Inter-American Convention at Art. XVI and XVII.
39. Id. at Art. XIII, 2-4.
40. Id. at Art. XXIV.
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consistency. The more widespread the ratification and the full implementation
of the Inter-American Convention, the greater the likelihood it will receive similar
treatment in a greater number of countries.
IV. Other Developments
Since the ABA first took a position on deterring corrupt practices in the conduct
of international business, there has been much activity in international fora and
institutions other than the OAS. To date, none of the initiatives in these other
fora are as comprehensive or have progressed as far as the Inter-American Con-
vention. The developments with a number of these initiatives are significant and
should also be given consideration and support.
A. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
On May 23, 1997, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) adopted a Revised Recommendation of the Council on Combating
Bribery in International Business Transactions (Revised Recommendation). 41 The
Revised Recommendation reiterates previous positions taken by the OECD and
takes note of intervening action taken by other international bodies.42 It also
reaffirms the need of member countries to criminalize the bribery of foreign
public officials.43
Compared to the OECD's previous recommendations, the Revised Recommen-
dation is more affirmative in nature and broader in scope. It makes specific
reference to the need for accounting requirements and external audit and internal
company controls. 44 In addition, its provisions address the need to deny tax
deductibility of bribes, making public procurement transparent and facilitating
international cooperation. 45 But possibly the most important outcome of the Re-
vised Recommendation is the "Agreed Upon Common Elements of Criminal
Legislation and Related Action" set forth in the Annex.46 In both language and
approach, they are fundamentally in accord with the basic principles of the FCPA,
and they provide a sound basis for moving towards appropriate and effective
measures to deter foreign corrupt practices.
However, instead of endorsing unilateral action by member countries, the
OECD's Revised Recommendation calls for the negotiation of an international
convention. 4 Deferring to the negotiation of an international convention has been
viewed in many quarters as a setback to efforts to deter corrupt practices in
41. OECD/C(97)123/FINAL.
42. Id. at 2.
43. Id. at 3.
44. Id. at 3.
45. Id. at 3-6.
46. Id. at 7-9.
47. Id.
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the conduct of international business.48 Despite the strong language calling for
negotiations to begin promptly, for the treaty to be open for signature by the end
of 1997, and for the treaty to enter into force twelve months thereafter,49 there
is concern that some OECD member countries insisted on an international conven-
tion as a subterfuge for further delay.5°
It is essential that the current momentum not be lost. Every effort should be
made to ensure that the commitments called for in the Revised Recommendation
are kept. This includes maintaining the schedule for the negotiations and, ulti-
mately, the timing at which an international convention enters into force. It also
includes minimizing reservations and understandings and fully implementing and
actively enforcing an international convention. But in balancing these interests,
great care must be exercised to avoid reducing an international convention to no
more than a set of hortatory principles. The common elements, definitions and
jurisdictional requirements of any international convention must be sufficiently
broad and flexible so as to be an effective guide and mechanism for deterring
foreign corrupt practices in the conduct of international business.
B. EUROPEAN UNION
On the same day that the OECD adopted its Revised Recommendation, May
23, 1997, the European Union (EU) adopted a Convention on the Fight Against
Corruption Involving Officials of the European Communities or Officials of
Member States of the European Union (EU Convention). 5' The EU Convention
criminalizes the bribery of EU officials as well as public officials of EU member
countries. It represents another major step in the international movement towards
deterring corrupt practices in the conduct of international business. Regrettably,
it does not prohibit transnational bribery of foreign officials of countries that are
not part of the EU, including the United States, the remainder of the industrialized
world and all of the developing world.
C. UNITED NATIONS
In the United Nations, the United States introduced in 1996 a proposal for a
"United Nations Declaration on Corruption and Bribery in Transnational Com-
mercial Activities., 52 The proposal called on member states to criminalize both
domestic and international bribery and to prohibit the tax deductibility of bribes.
It was adopted by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations,
48. See, e.g., S. Goldschlager and S. Marcuss, "Getting Out From Under the Table," Wash.
Post, July 14, 1997, at A19.
49. OECD/C(97)123/FINAL at 7-9.
50. See, e.g., S. Goldschlager and S. Marcuss, "Getting Out From Under the Table."
51. Report of Senior Official, U.S. Department of Justice, June 27, 1997.
52. Fourth Annual Report of Trade Promotion Committee at 117.
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ECOSOC, on July 23, 1996," 3 and later led to the adoption on December 12,
1996, by the General Assembly of the United Nations of a resolution adopting
an "International Code of Conduct for Public Officials" and calling for increased
efforts to deter corruption in its various forms, including those international
54economic activities carried out by corporate entities.
D. WORLD BANK
In 1996, the World Bank (Bank) took pronounced action against bribery by
explicitly establishing a policy for not tolerating fraud or corruption in Bank-
financed contracts by bidders or borrowers." The Bank will reject proposals for
contract awards or cancel the portion of a loan if the bidder or the borrower has
engaged in fraud or corruption in the procurement or execution of the contract.
"Companies determined by the Bank to have engaged in corrupt or fraudulent
practices will be blacklisted from participation in Bank-financed contracts, either
indefinitely or for a stated period of time."56
V. The Need for a Common Approach
To date, the United States is the only country with experience in criminalizing
and prosecuting the bribery of foreign officials. This experience should be instruc-
tive as other countries begin to implement and enforce provisions criminalizing
the bribery of foreign officials. But regardless of the extent to which U.S. law
is taken as a model, the effectiveness of the Inter-American Convention and the
degree to which it is implemented and enforced will be enhanced by developing
common elements and consistency in its terms and application. Otherwise, the
proliferation of divergent national laws and approaches will not only make more
difficult compliance with the Inter-American Convention, it ultimately will under-
mine efforts to deter foreign corrupt practices.
Accordingly, the definitions, common elements, and scope of application of
the prohibitions on the bribery of foreign officials developed by the Working
Group on Bribery of the OECD, and incorporated in the Annex of the Revised
Recommendation, should be a guide for countries implementing the Inter-
American Convention. The work-product of the Working Group that is set forth
in the Annex is consistent with the provisions of the Inter-American Convention,
and provides a clear enumeration of the elements of the offense and other key
concerns. It is also representative of the U.S. experience and, more importantly,
reflects a common view of legal experts from a wide range of backgrounds and
experiences throughout the world:
53. E.S.C. Res. 1996/8, U.N. ESCOR, 45th pl. mtg., U.N. Doc. E/C.1996/8 (1996).
54. G.A. Res. 51/59, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/59 (1997), 2 and 7.
55. Fourth Annual Report of Trade Promotion Committee at 118.
56. Id.
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1. Elements of the Offense of Active Bribery
i. Bribery is understood as the promise or giving of any undue payment
or other advantages, whether directly or through intermediaries to a
public official, for himself or for a third party, to influence the official
act or refrain from acting in the performance of his or her official duties
in order to obtain or retain business.
ii. Foreign public official means any person holding a legislative, adminis-
trative or judicial office of a foreign country or in an international
organization, whether appointed or elected, or any person exercising
a public function or task in a foreign country.
iii. The offeror is any person, on his own behalf or on the behalf of any
other natural person or legal entity.
2. Ancillary Elements or Offenses
The general criminal law concepts of attempt, complicity and/or conspiracy
of the law of the prosecuting state should be recognized as applicable to
the offense of bribery of a foreign public official.
3. Excuses and Defenses
Bribery of public officials in order to obtain or retain business is an offense
irrespective of the value of the bribe, of perceptions of local custom or of
the tolerance of bribery by local authorities.
4. Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction over the offense of bribery of foreign public officials should
in any case be established when the offense is committed in whole or in
part in the prosecuting State's territory. The territorial basis for jurisdiction
should be interpreted broadly so that an extensive physical connection to
the bribery act can be minimal.
States which prosecute their nationals for offenses committed abroad should
do so in respect of the bribery of foreign public officials according to the
same principles.
States which do not prosecute on the basis of the nationality principle should
be prepared to extradite their nationals in respect of the bribery of foreign
public officials.
All countries should review whether their current basis for jurisdiction is
effective in the fight against bribery of foreign public officials and, if not,
should take appropriate remedial steps.
5. Sanctions
The offense of bribery of foreign public officials should be sanctioned/
punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties,
sufficient to secure effective mutual legal assistance and extradition, compa-
rable to those applicable to the bribers in cases of corruption of domestic
public officials.
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Monetary or other civil, administrative or criminal penalties on any legal
person involved, should be provided, taking into account the amounts of
the bribe and of the profits derived from the transaction obtained through
the bribe.
Forfeiture or confiscation of instrumentalities and of the bribe benefits and
of the profits derived from the transaction obtained through the bribe should
be provided, or comparable fines or damages imposed.
6. Enforcement
In view of the seriousness of the offense of bribery of foreign public officials,
public prosecutors should exercise their discretion independently, based on
preferential motives. They should not be influenced by considerations of
national economic interest, fostering good political relations or the identity
of the victim.
Complaints of victims should be seriously investigated by the competent
authorities.
The statute of limitations should allow adequate time to address this complex
offense.
National governments should provide adequate resources to prosecuting
authorities so as to permit effective prosecution of bribery of foreign public
officials.
7. Connected Provisions (Criminal and Non-criminal)
-Accounting, Record-Keeping and Disclosure
In order to combat bribery of foreign public officials effectively, states
should also adequately sanction accounting omissions, falsifications and
fraud.
-Money laundering
The bribery of foreign public officials should be made a predicate offence
for purposes of money laundering legislation where bribery of a domestic
public official is a money laundering predicate offence, without regard
to the place where the bribery occurs.
8. International Co-operation
Effective mutual legal assistance is critical to be able to investigate and obtain
evidence in order to prosecute cases of bribery of foreign public officials.
Adoption of laws criminalizing the bribery of foreign public officials would
remove obstacles to mutual legal assistance created by dual criminality
requirements.
Countries should tailor their laws on mutual legal assistance to permit co-
operation with countries investigating cases of bribery of foreign public
officials even including third countries (country of the offeror; country
where the act occurred) and countries applying different types of criminali-
zation legislation to reach such cases.
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In 1995, the ABA adopted a Recommendation supporting efforts "by the
international community, by national governments, and by non-government orga-
nizations to encourage the adoption and implementation of effective legal mea-
sures and mechanisms to deter corrupt practices in the conduct of international
business." 5 At that time, it was unclear to what extent international initiatives
then in their initial stages would produce "hard" rather than "soft" law.5 9 The
Inter-American Convention is one of the first critical steps in converting the
rather recent and dramatic international developments into binding obligations
that could result in effective mechanisms to prevent bribery and related conduct
in the course of international business.
The ABA's support is not only critical to facilitating the ratification and imple-
mentation of the OAS Convention, it is important to a broader range of efforts. The
ABA has a distinctive role in these efforts inasmuch as it represents a community of
lawyers uniquely qualified to address the range of issues associated with guiding
the development and implementation of effective measures to deter corrupt prac-
tices in the conduct of international business. The United States remains the only
country to date to take affirmative steps to penalize such corrupt practices on
the part of its citizens, residents and businesses. U.S. lawyers therefore have years
of experience addressing the multitude of issues associated with implementing and
complying with such legal regimes.
For this reason, the Recommendation is meant to be broad in its scope so that
the ABA and its members can play an active and constructive role in the ratification
and implementation of the OAS Convention and in the ongoing efforts through
the OECD to negotiate and implement a convention criminalizing the bribery of
foreign officials. The ABA's support is neither unlimited nor undefined. Such
support and assistance must be guided by the basic principles of the FCPA and
the common elements in the Annex to the Revised Recommendation of the OECD.
Without a common focus, international efforts to deter foreign corrupt practices




57. OECD/C(97)123/FINAL at 7-9.
58. ABA Recommendation and Report.
59. Id. at 5.
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